Monday, 03.31.08
Iraq's Forever War
ESSAM AL-SUDANI/AFP/Getty Images
After Iraq
January/February 2008
Jeffrey Goldberg reports from the new Middle East--and glimpses its possible future.
Why Iraq Has No Army
December 2005
A Report from Iraq
30 January 2008
For over a year now, political discussions of Iraq have focused on the question of whether or not the surge strategy is "working." This appeals to the can-do spirit of Americans, but as the winding-down battle in Basra indicates it does little justice to the complexity of the situation in Iraq.
A key element in America's recent strategy of forming alliances with elements of the domestic Sunni Arab insurgency in order to fight al-Qaeda in Iraq has been U.S. support for the idea of holding new provincial elections in order to help our new friends (who also happen to be anti-government rebels) acquire local political power. This, however, perturbed the central government in Baghdad, whose main constituent parties, Dawa and the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, currently control provincial government in the south but fear losing power to Muqtada al-Sadr's movement. Hence, Nouri al-Maliki's sudden determination to try to assert government authority in Basra, an area that's long been under the practical control of an array of different Shiite mafias who rose to power under the British military's efforts to pursue a policy of benign neglect.
The Bush administration chose to support Maliki's military campaign, and sought to portray it as a battle against Iranian-backed forces. And, indeed, Sadr himself has been known to complain about Iranian influence over elements (the so-called "Special Groups") of his movement. In reality, however, the anti-Sadrist forces we're supporting are also backed by Iran, exile parties that were literally founded in Teheran during the Iran-Iraq War. The all-pervasive nature of Iranian influence over Iraqi Shiite politics was on full display in the fact that the fighting was brought to an end by Iranian mediation rather than force of arms.
All of which raises the question of why we're in bed with ISCI in the first place. Years ago, ISCI and Dawa decided to collaborate with the U.S. occupation authorities whereas the Sadr movement deemed it illegitimate and demanded withdrawal. That decision locked us in to the current path and reminds that to a considerable extent the goal of the American military presence in Iraq is simply to continue the American military presence in Iraq and that means forging alliances with whichever Iraqi groups are willing to have us.
A defining momentPaul Kiel writes that "Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's offensive in Basra and Baghdad against Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr's forces has confirmed his government's essential weakness." |
Outside influenceJuan Cole writes that "the entire episode underlines how powerful Iran has become in Iraq." |
Found in translationThe Los Angeles Times translates Moqtada al-Sadr's statement. |
To protect and serveCharles J. Hanley reports on the troubled efforts to successfully build an Iraqi army. |
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At this point in time when Bush makes a statement, many of us know to accept the opposite as truth.
"All of which raises the question of why we're in bed with ISCI in the first place."
Geez, we dunno. Maybe it could have something to do with support for the legitimate government?
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"...the goal of the American military presence in Iraq is simply to continue the American military presence in Iraq..."
You hit the bull's eye.
Posted by priyaranjan pandit | March 31, 2008 7:28 PM