Thursday, 03.13.08
No Gauchos for Condi
Photo by Flickr user pablodf under a Creative Commons license
Thursday, 03.13.08 No Gauchos for CondiPhoto by Flickr user pablodf under a Creative Commons license
The "carnal relations" that former Argentine foreign minister Guido di Tella helped to inaugurate between his country and the United States in the 1990s have long since cooled. Condi can't be bothered to give new President Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner a peck on the cheek, much less do the tango -- just as President Bush didn't drop by to see outgoing President Nestor Kirchner on his trip to the region last year. It's easy to blame the break-up on the Kirchners' anti-American rhetoric and their embrace of Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez. But that ignores the ripple effect of the Bush administration's decision seven years ago to pull the plug on an International Monetary Fund rescue package for Argentina, prompting the country to default on its debts and paving the path to power for the Kirchners. Treasury Secretary Paul O'Neill's "tough love" approach to Argentina in 2001 has its admirers: after all, the Argentines had gotten themselves into a debt hole, bailing them out raised the risk of moral hazard, and their ultimate default didn't unleash any financial contagion. But that free-market rectitude would have been more convincing if it had been applied to other countries (like Turkey), much less our own (like our ill-considered steel tariffs, absurd farm subsidies, and bailouts of banks and hedge funds). Moreover, Argentina's pro-U.S. tilt went beyond economic neoliberalism: It also abandoned its Condor II missile, gave up its nuclear race with Brazil, led the way in multilateral peacekeeping (it joined up in the first Gulf War, in Bosnia, and offered troops for Afghanistan), and voted with the U.S. at the UN. And now instead we have the Kirchners, who have repudiated not just the so-called Washington Consensus, but Washington. In deciding to let Argentina go down the tubes in 2001, the Bush administration delivered an insignificant economic lesson at a high political price. That decision was an example of a kind of strategic malpractice that has gone well beyond Iraq, Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan, and North Korea. After almost eight years of President Bush in office, there are very few countries, from the G-7 on down (I still find laughable the idea of a "G-8" that includes Russia), whose ties with the United States are not only warmer but stronger than they were at the end of the Clinton administration. But I'd be delighted to be proved wrong (bonus points if the countries you cite are listed as "Free" on Freedom House's index).
(3) ...And I am going to do the same thing in Venezuela, once that country's peso goes to caca thanks to Chavez's policies.
Which reminds me of an Old Latin American get-rich-quick scheme: buy an Argentinian for what he is worth, and sell him for what he thinks he is worth.
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Egregiously wrong analysis.
For far too long Argentina had enjoyed--yes enjoyed--a pattern of going into debt getting bailed out, just to do it again, and again, and again. This vicious cycle has not occurred ever since the US pulled the plug on the bail out.
And be sure that the Kirchner's love for Chavez will end as soon as Venezuela's economy collapses due to all the oil freebies Chavez is handing out to countries such as Argentina to bribe political favor.
Full disclosure: I bought a Rolex for $300 USD, and a slew of decadent dinners due to the Argentinian currency crisis.
Posted by Luis A. del Valle | March 14, 2008 12:40 AM