Wednesday, 08.13.08
Georgia's Guerrilla Option
Getty Images
The Russian assault on Georgia holds a number of important lessons. As a weak state facing a regional hegemon committed to its dismemberment and isolation, Georgia sought to integrate into NATO and other trans-Atlantic institutions, hoping that powerful friends would defang the Russian threat. But as Robert D. Kaplan argued earlier this week, European dependence on Russian energy exports gives Russia a great deal of political leverage. Fear of provoking Russia led European states to resist accepting Georgia as a member of NATO last year, and it has deterred them from taking strong action to punish Russia for its actions in the current crisis.
Georgia’s military humiliation also suggests that smaller powers that seek protection under the American security umbrella will increasingly have to go it alone. Constraints on American power - the ongoing U.S. military presence in Iraq and Afghanistan, a renewed distaste for armed intervention on the part of the American public, even the yawning size of the federal budget deficit - will most likely lead the next president to look inward, to seek conciliation over confrontation even if that means giving inconvenient allies the cold shoulder. One has to assume that Taiwan has watched the tepid American response to Russia’s power-grab very closely.
As for Russia, its actions in Georgia make a great deal of sense when viewed through the lens of petro-politics. As military analyst John Robb notes, Russia’s coercive efforts in its so-called “Near Abroad” have generally been prompted by a desire to control the flow of energy to the rich democracies. Estonia tried to scuttle the creation of a pipeline that would cut them out of transit revenues, so the Russians orchestrated a series of thuggish cyberattacks. Ukraine tried to control the pipelines crossing its sovereign territory, which led the Russians to cut off the energy spigot. When a pipeline running from Azerbaijan to Georgia to the Mediterranean port of Ceyhan in Turkey threatened to displace traffic from an exisiting Russian pipeline, the Russians sabotaged Georgia’s energy infrastructure. The only thing new about the Russian aggression we’ve seen this past week is that it’s been overt.
So what are the Georgias of the world to do? Weak states might take a page from the most fearsome non-state actors: guerrillas and criminal gangs. During its 2006 military campaign in Lebanon, Israeli forces severely degraded Hezbollah’s military capabilities, but Hezbollah survived. Hezbollah continued to use a variety of asymmetric attacks throughout the conflict to spread fear throughout Israel’s civilian population. The resilience of Israeli society saw to it that Hezbollah could do no lasting damage, but Hezbollah exacted a stiff price all the same.
It would be sheer insanity for Georgia to wage a Hezbollah-style terror campaign against Russian civilians. But in a detailed scenario about the Chechen fight for independence, John Robb devised a potentially very effective strategy that draws on the guerrilla playbook. Just as Russia disrupted Georgia’s critical infrastructure in 2006, Georgia might consider identifying key economic chokepoints - ports, power plants, long-distance electrical transmission lines, and of course natural gas pipelines - and training unconventional military forces to deliver crippling blows. While Russia would be prepared for a few discrete acts of sabotage, they would have a hard time dealing with a rolling, unpredictable series of attacks targeting multiple locations. By disrupting Russia’s infrastructure, Georgia could inflict severe pain at relatively low cost. Moreover, Europe would be impacted as well - which would make the European public think twice about acquiescing to Russia’s thuggish tactics in its own backyard.
To be sure, Russia might then decide to level Georgia - but they’d have to do so with their economy and ruins and their international reputation in tatters.
Next generationJohn Robb describes how Chechen guerrillas could use asymmetrical warfare to force Russia to grant independence. |
Strategic edgeThe San Francisco Chronicle explains how Hezbollah countered Israel's conventional military advantage during the 2006 conflict. |
Dangerous gamesBrij Khindaria writes that Russia's military action created a new geopolitical order in which Hezbollah-like proxies could proliferate. |
Conventional powerAccording to Martin Sieff, the Russian-Georgian conflict proves that traditional military force, when used aggressively, still trumps unconventional strategies. |
(12)
The Russian response to a Hamas or Hezbollah style campaign will be a type of response that Israel just can not do. A small country, dependent on western powers, can not afford too much collateral damage. Russia do not have those constrains. There will be no surgical strikes; the response will destroy the county and its people. Asymmetric war works only against restrained power. Non state entities do not care about the state or the welfare of its people.
The populations of South Ossetia and Abkhazia are masters of guerrilla warfare. Very tough warriors. Some photos from Georgia:
http://lsd-25.ru/2008/08/14/voyna-v-yuzhnoy-osetii-89-fotografiy-arkadiya-babchenko/
The author raises an interesting point, but it I doubt it will work. The world has higher moral expectations for Israel than other countries for a variety of reasons, some legitimate and some not. But the salient point is that Israel did not display it's full power against Hezbullah because of pressure from the its own allies, from the Arab and Muslim worlds, the UN, and domestically because Israel isn't brutal like Russia. Were the Georgians to take a page from Hezbullah's book, the Russians will crush them utterly without compunction or mercy. This is because the Georgians do not have oil, they do not have fanatical terrorist friends, they are not the darlings of the international far left, and, again Russia is ruthless and brutal.
The author raises an interesting point, but it I doubt it will work. The world has higher moral expectations for Israel than other countries for a variety of reasons, some legitimate and some not. But the salient point is that Israel did not display it's full power against Hezbullah because of pressure from the its own allies, from the Arab and Muslim worlds, the UN, and domestically because Israel isn't brutal like Russia. Were the Georgians to take a page from Hezbullah's book, the Russians will crush them utterly without compunction or mercy. This is because the Georgians do not have oil, they do not have fanatical terrorist friends, they are not the darlings of the international far left, and, again, Russia is ruthless and brutal.
As I recall the Chechens fought a guerrilla war (or wars) against Russia similar to Mr. Salam's description. Grozny was flattened and now an pro-Russian chief executive rules Chechnya as a ruthless autocrat. I don't know that the differences between Chechnya and Georgia are such that a dissimilar outcome could be expected.
you're supposed to be the guiding light of the next generation of american conservatives? jesus christ, things are a lot worse than i thought! this is, to be blunt, fucking retarded. let me repeat that, reihan, this idea is one of the fucking stupidest things i've ever read. guerilla war against the russians? ask the chechens how that worked out (or the poles, or the ukranians, or, for that matter the afghans. i know i know the russians "lost" in afghanistan. many more "victories like that" and there won't be a single afghan left).
additionally, you didn't even attempt to explain just how georgians (who are instantly recognizable to most russians because of their distintive physical appearance and accent) would manage to infiltrate sensitive economic and military infrastructure undetected.
i thought putin was supposed to be mr. neo-nazi scary man, we're to believe that he will simply allow a host of ethnically recognizable terrorists to throw the russian economy into "ruins?"
this would actually be funny if you weren't serious.
Had the Georgians prepared for this event with shaped explosive charges buried at the road sides - and a supply of the rockets Hezbollah used to such effect against Israeli tanks - the world would have seen an entirely different show this week. The Russians might have continued their invasion, but perhaps they would also have been reminded of past misadventures (Afghanistan) and been dissuaded from future ones (Ukraine). Now, one can only assume they have been energized and emboldened. Other writers have commented on the likelihood of a brutal Russian response to guerrilla tactics, and indeed their Soviet forbearers resorted to poison gas attacks on Afghan mujahideen. One writer even makes a vacuous attempt to equate Russia's invasion of a sovereign democracy with other recent conflicts. This "moral equivalency" argument, a favorite of Soviet apologists throughout the Cold War era, falls flat unless one believes the democratically elected Saakashvili is on a par with Sadaam Hussein, Balkan war criminals, and the Taliban.
Reihan,
I can't help but echo some of the criticism you've been getting. If I read your piece correctly, you seem to be suggesting the "guerrilla option" as a somewhat risky but potentially viable strategy for Georgian resistance to Russian domination. Such a strategy, quite aside from its ethical dubiousness, would be catastrophic for the Georgians. There are any number of obvious objections, ones which, quite frankly, I would expect you to anticipate.
Much depends on whether Russia chooses to occupy Tbilisi and the Georgian heartland or, as seems to be the case right now, limit its military presence to its client enclaves (where Russian forces have already been deployed for quite some time, and seem to enjoy a high level of acceptance from the local (non-Georgian) population) and perhaps strategic zones abutting those areas. If the Russians opt for total occupation, then guerrilla resistance would be justified but also extremely difficult - the region would be locked down by Russian troops, infiltration across the border would be extremely difficult, and resistance groups would have more proximate concerns than attacking Russian infrastructure. Without a general occupation, any sabotage activity - still extremely difficult to carry out given the problems of infiltration across a militarized border - together with the inevitable civilian casualties that would result sooner or later (no one has ever managed to run a clean insurgency, not even Mandela's ANC) would turn Saakashvili's Georgia from a beleaguered aspiring democracy into a state sponsor of terrorism. Georgians living in Russia would be at great risk both from the security apparatus and a jingoistic general population, and even harsh reprisals could be justified using the language of "the war on terror." You are correct that European reliance on Russian energy sources would motivate the EU to take a stand on the issue, but that stand would almost certainly take the form of tacit support for repressive measures against Georgian sabotage rather than concessions rewarding violent tactics. A Georgian guerrilla campaign would invite serious Russian reprisals, place ethnic Georgians in Russia in jeopardy, and help legitimate Russian domination of the area by producing a real security threat (where hitherto there was nothing but the pretense of one) while undercutting the legitimacy of Georgia's position.
Reihan, this isn't just bad advice - it's absolute poison.
A guerilla war by the Georgians would be suicidal.
Russia effectively squelched Chechen resistance by using the tactics of the Roman legions -- exterminating all guerillas and enough of enveloping population to convince the survivors that attacks mean certain death. The Russians wiped the Chechen capital off the map, then rebuilt it and marched the survivors back in, I'd guess with a hefty supply of new Russian residents.
The Romans put down very determined resistance with spears and arrows -- it was their willingness to kill vast numbers of "barbarians" that sealed their many victories.
It's what the US won't do in Iraq (I'm not advocating this, we'd be descending even lower, and for an absurd "goal") and the reason why we can't succeed, at least quickly, against guerilla armies.
I remember pictures of Putin handing out trophy knives, big Bowie-class killing instruments -- to anti-Chechen fighters. This isn't an idiot like Bremer or Bush. This is a guy who's willing to do what's necessary to win.
Get ready for a rough ride, as long as the neocon morons are running our foreign policy.
Reihan,
Your thesis relies on many weak assumptions, expressed or not, and none more important than the proposition that failing states (however real, democratic, binding and effective) always provide public good. That all runts must be protected at all costs from foreign interventions. That the territorial integrity of "Georgia-in-its-current-Stalinian-configuration" is sacrosanct, notwithstanding the demise of the key terms of the original bargain.
I see no cash flow, no economic, no opportunity cost analysis (no number at all in fact, except dates) that might even remotely explain the self-interest of South Ossetians, Abkazs, or Georgians for that matter. Only foreign policy arguments and other explanations that would never meet Popper's falsifiability test (let's be clear, there is no such thing as political sciences!) Only opinions that, in this case as most others, utterly ignore the private point of view of hundred of thousand of individuals upon which these FP (always foreign) considerations are foisted.
Failing grades for suggesting rebellion, guerilla and the possible loss of one more life without any illustration of their NPV to any of the individuals or groups involved. What's in it for them exactly?
Spot on Reihan,
Many have raised valid counters, but even these have ther answers. This is considered doable with in Special Operations circles. With proper training and resourcing, and, political will. The US 10th Special Forces Group was involved in just such a scenario prior to 9/11
How can a guerilla option work when the majority of the populations of South Ossetia and Abkhazia back the Russian intervention?
These are break-away republics that have had de-facto independence since the early 1990s. Georgia's president sent in the army to force them back into Georgia against the (current) population's wishes, and Russia sent in its army to push the Georgian army back out.
I don't believe that Russia's intervention is in any way noble or selfless, but if we in the west are going to criticize them, we'll first have to come up with a very good story about how South Ossetia and Abkhazia are different from Kosovo and East Timor, not to mention Afghanistan and Iraq.
Posted by David Megginson | August 14, 2008 2:08 PM