Monday, 09.08.08

The Iraq War Isn't Over

PHOTO BY THAIER AL-SUDANI-POOL/GETTY IMAGES

John McCain's address to the Republican National Convention stressed the success of the surge. But the emerging Iraq state remains extremely vulnerable.

In an interview with The Atlantic’s Jeffrey Goldberg, New York Times correspondent Dexter Filkins noted the extraordinary security turnaround in much of Iraq.

The progress here is remarkable. I came back to Iraq after being away for nearly two years, and honestly, parts of it are difficult for me to recognize. The park out in front of the house where I live -- on the Tigris River -- was a dead, dying, spooky place. It's now filled with people -- families with children, women walking alone, even at night. That was inconceivable in 2006. The Iraqis who are out there walking in the parks were making their own judgments ­that it is safe enough for them to go out for a walk. They're voting with their feet. It's a wonderful thing to see.

But as Filkins goes on to explain, the key driver of the turnaround has been the rise of the Sunni Awakening. And the Awakening movement is as alienated as ever from Maliki's central government. While the American public seems to have moved on from Iraq, renewed violence is a real possibility.

One of the stranger episodes in the presidential campaign so far has been the mutual embrace of Barack Obama and Iraqi premier Nouri al-Maliki. Once derided as a feckless puppet -- of the Iranians, of the Americans, or both, depending on who's talking -- Maliki’s reputation and self-confidence have been enhanced mightily by the increasing competence of the Iraqi military, which has been greatly facilitated by the surge. And Maliki's newfound confidence has in some sense undermined the central goal of the surge strategy, namely nudging Iraq’s leadership class towards achieving an equitable and enduring political settlement. As Maliki’s confidence grows, so, apparently, does his belief that he is not so much a transitional figure as a nationalist hero, the man who won Iraq for its Shiite majority and ended the occupation.

The trouble with Maliki’s vision is that it leaves no room for the Sunni Awakening. One increasingly gets the sense that Maliki sees the Sons of Iraq, one of many names for the various Sunni militias that have turned against the insurgency, as a threat. Which is entirely understandable -- a proper state possesses a monopoly on legitimate force, and it makes perfect sense that he would eventually disband irregular militias. But the Sons of Iraq have no confidence that there will be adequate representation of Sunni interests in the new Iraqi state, and Maliki hasn’t exactly helped in this regard.

The Iraqi government now wants to purchase a modern air force -- 36 F-16 fighter jets, to wean itself off American military assistance. If Maliki’s Iraqi state were an American ally, the purchase would be unproblematic. But what kind of state is emerging in Iraq? Will it be the kind that permits free and fair elections, and in which religious minorities and other minorities of conscience can be confident that their rights will be protected and their interests respected? Maybe not. As the United States plans to reduce its military footprint in Iraq, spurred on by Maliki, it is worth keeping in mind that representation for Iraq’s minorities is the only guarantee of lasting peace. And for now, only U.S. military forces can ensure that an election will be free and fair.

Starting this October, the Iraqi government will begin paying the salaries of the Sons of Iraq. Roughly a fifth will be integrated into the ISF, and others will (so it is claimed) be given civilian employment. Perhaps all is well. But what will happen if the integration of the Sunni fighters is derailed? Imagine the politics of such a disastrous turn. The surge strategy will be (unfairly) discredited, despite the fact that the logic of the surge strategy now counsels a continued American military presence, precisely to prevent the reemergence of sectarian conflict.

Over the next few months, there is a real danger that parts of Iraq we consider peaceful will again flare up. Don’t be surprised if it elements within the Sons of Iraq choose to go rogue, enraged by the refusal of Maliki to integrate them into the Iraqi Security Forces, or by fraudulent elections.

Advocates of a continued American presence have much to answer for as well. Why is it that Maliki hasn’t made the necessary concessions? What can the U.S. do to encourage reconciliation that hasn’t been done? Has the economic strategy of the Iraqi government been adequate to the task of rebuilding the country? It was fair and reasonable to neglect these considerations during the struggle to bring Iraq back from the brink. But that neglect has proved very costly indeed.

— Reihan Salam

Filed Under: Foreign Policy, Iraq, Maliki, Obama, Withdrawal