Iraq

John McCain's address to the Republican National Convention stressed the success of the surge. But the emerging Iraq state remains extremely vulnerable.

In an interview with The Atlantic’s Jeffrey Goldberg, New York Times correspondent Dexter Filkins noted the extraordinary security turnaround in much of Iraq.

The progress here is remarkable. I came back to Iraq after being away for nearly two years, and honestly, parts of it are difficult for me to recognize. The park out in front of the house where I live -- on the Tigris River -- was a dead, dying, spooky place. It's now filled with people -- families with children, women walking alone, even at night. That was inconceivable in 2006. The Iraqis who are out there walking in the parks were making their own judgments ­that it is safe enough for them to go out for a walk. They're voting with their feet. It's a wonderful thing to see.

But as Filkins goes on to explain, the key driver of the turnaround has been the rise of the Sunni Awakening. And the Awakening movement is as alienated as ever from Maliki's central government. While the American public seems to have moved on from Iraq, renewed violence is a real possibility.

One of the stranger episodes in the presidential campaign so far has been the mutual embrace of Barack Obama and Iraqi premier Nouri al-Maliki. Once derided as a feckless puppet -- of the Iranians, of the Americans, or both, depending on who's talking -- Maliki’s reputation and self-confidence have been enhanced mightily by the increasing competence of the Iraqi military, which has been greatly facilitated by the surge. And Maliki's newfound confidence has in some sense undermined the central goal of the surge strategy, namely nudging Iraq’s leadership class towards achieving an equitable and enduring political settlement. As Maliki’s confidence grows, so, apparently, does his belief that he is not so much a transitional figure as a nationalist hero, the man who won Iraq for its Shiite majority and ended the occupation.

The trouble with Maliki’s vision is that it leaves no room for the Sunni Awakening. One increasingly gets the sense that Maliki sees the Sons of Iraq, one of many names for the various Sunni militias that have turned against the insurgency, as a threat. Which is entirely understandable -- a proper state possesses a monopoly on legitimate force, and it makes perfect sense that he would eventually disband irregular militias. But the Sons of Iraq have no confidence that there will be adequate representation of Sunni interests in the new Iraqi state, and Maliki hasn’t exactly helped in this regard.

The Iraqi government now wants to purchase a modern air force -- 36 F-16 fighter jets, to wean itself off American military assistance. If Maliki’s Iraqi state were an American ally, the purchase would be unproblematic. But what kind of state is emerging in Iraq? Will it be the kind that permits free and fair elections, and in which religious minorities and other minorities of conscience can be confident that their rights will be protected and their interests respected? Maybe not. As the United States plans to reduce its military footprint in Iraq, spurred on by Maliki, it is worth keeping in mind that representation for Iraq’s minorities is the only guarantee of lasting peace. And for now, only U.S. military forces can ensure that an election will be free and fair.

Starting this October, the Iraqi government will begin paying the salaries of the Sons of Iraq. Roughly a fifth will be integrated into the ISF, and others will (so it is claimed) be given civilian employment. Perhaps all is well. But what will happen if the integration of the Sunni fighters is derailed? Imagine the politics of such a disastrous turn. The surge strategy will be (unfairly) discredited, despite the fact that the logic of the surge strategy now counsels a continued American military presence, precisely to prevent the reemergence of sectarian conflict.

Over the next few months, there is a real danger that parts of Iraq we consider peaceful will again flare up. Don’t be surprised if it elements within the Sons of Iraq choose to go rogue, enraged by the refusal of Maliki to integrate them into the Iraqi Security Forces, or by fraudulent elections.

Advocates of a continued American presence have much to answer for as well. Why is it that Maliki hasn’t made the necessary concessions? What can the U.S. do to encourage reconciliation that hasn’t been done? Has the economic strategy of the Iraqi government been adequate to the task of rebuilding the country? It was fair and reasonable to neglect these considerations during the struggle to bring Iraq back from the brink. But that neglect has proved very costly indeed.

Congressional Democrats continue to hold up a free-trade deal with Colombia.

All the debate about Colombian free trade has obscured something important: Colombia is far safer now than it was five years ago. In fact, if Iraq were reclaiming terrorist-controlled areas as effectively as Colombia is, even the most die-hard opponents of the Iraq War would admit error. Colombia is, after Iraq and Afghanistan, our third-biggest nation-building project, and it is by far our most successful.

Invisible Nation, Quil Lawrence's book about the last two decades of Iraqi Kurdish history and politics, is published by Walker.

The south of Iraq is dominated by prickly and humorless factions -- groups often indifferent to the perceptions of outsiders, and rarely willing to soften their image to soothe the nerves of the journalists who want to report on them. The north of Iraq presents the opposite problem: the Kurds are just so damned smooth, so endlessly accommodating, that a journalist has to keep his guard up to make sure he isn't getting played.

Gen. David Petraeus was named the new head of United States Central Command, the military command unit that oversees Iraq and Afghanistan.

Petraeus's appointment as combatant commander of Central Command was set in motion several weeks ago, with the firing of then-combatant commander Adm. William Fallon. The administration let him go not for opposing a possible strike against Iran, as was widely speculated, but for arguing too often with Petraeus over troop levels in Iraq. Petraeus, who may be the most well-read analytical mind in the military, wanted to maintain troop levels, rather than reduce them for use in Afghanistan and for other contingencies -- to say nothing of relieving strains on the army. But Fallon and Pentagon generals wanted troop levels in Iraq to come down. Petraeus won the debate.

Patrick Cockburn's Muqtada, an account of the life and ascent of Mahdi Army leader Muqtada al-Sadr, is published by Scribner.

Four years ago last week, the subcommander of an armed faction in Iraq appeared in a grainy video -- shot somewhere in Baghdad and distributed to Western journalists -- and vowed to kill the leader of a rival group. Today that subcommander is alive but forgotten, and his rival, Muqtada al-Sadr, is one of the most powerful figures in the country. The forgotten subcommander, of course, is Gen. Ricardo Sanchez, the three-star whose command of Coalition forces in Iraq lasted a scant two months after he issued the kill order on Sadr. The contrast between Sadr's massive public rallies and Sanchez's furtive low-fi video should have given a clue as to how high young Sadr would rise.

A leaked U.S. document details the proliferation among Iraqi insurgents of proximity-fuze rockets, a deadly improvement on previous weapons.

The roadside bomb is the signature weapon of the Iraq war, but measured purely by the man-hours of dread they inspire, rockets and mortars easily have it beat. Roadside bombs kill soldiers only when they're on the road. But indirect fire can hit U.S. bases at any hour, in any place, and with little warning. (Some bases have red-alert sirens, which usually crank up only after the attack has started and are therefore widely ignored.) The homey comforts of the bases -- rich food, well-stocked stores, fast-food restaurants -- only increase the psychological stress, since they make death a constant presence during what otherwise feels like your safest moments. That war-zone Whopper tastes a lot less like comfort-food when you know each bite could be your last.

"The Aria of Chris Matthews," published in Sunday's New York Times Magazine, has earned considerable praise. And it's easy to see why -- the piece cuts with the grain of the received wisdom of our time, privileging the knowing comedy of Stewart and Colbert over Matthews's more confrontational approach. I should note that I worked for Matthews, and I'm keenly aware that he takes political argument very, very seriously. I also know that, as Mark Leibovich vividly illustrates in his profile, Matthews has a big, rambunctious personality. But what Leibovich fails to convey is that Matthews's supposed bombast is really a function of moral urgency. MORE

A Senate committee heard testimony from an Illinois woman who alleges that a co-worker and a soldier raped her while she worked in Iraq for KBR, the former Halliburton subsidiary and contracting giant.

Someone, somewhere, is hunting for rape statistics right now, to show that nationwide in the U.S., the rate of sexual assault is lower than the rate among contractors in Iraq. I would not be surprised if that is so. There are, for one thing, far fewer women per capita to assault among Iraq contractors than among the American population at large, and it's far more probable that a female contractor is armed or has easy access to a weapon of vengeance. On the other hand, there does seem to be a connection between gruesome crimes like this one and the climate of lawlessness and license in which military contractors operate.

Gen. David Petraeus and Amb. Ryan Crocker returned to Congress for hearings on the state of Iraq.

Time was when members of Congress didn’t have to rely on just the media, fact-finding tours, or high-profile hearings to find out what was going on in a theater of war. Instead, our representatives could turn to trusted ex-comrades or relatives for an on-the-ground view. But that was in another, better United States. Fewer and fewer senators or representatives have any military experience and the connections that come with it. MORE

Gen. David Petraeus and Amb. Ryan Crocker returned to Congress for hearings on the state of Iraq.

A critical moment during the Petraeus/Crocker hearings yesterday came when the general refused to play along. Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-South Carolina), referring to the Democratic presidential candidates, urged, cajoled, and all but begged Petraeus to state that a rapid, one-brigade-a-month troop withdrawal would be a disaster. But Petraeus was cautious: "It clearly will depend on the conditions at the time."

Nikolai Baibakov, Russia's last commissar, died last week at 98, and Yakup Satar, the last WWI veteran of the Ottoman Empire, died at 110.

If the phrase "Soviet commissar" has a vaguely old-fashioned ring -- like "icebox," "suffragette," or "antimacassar" -- then "Ottoman foot-soldier" has a near-ancient one. The two deaths this week consign both categories to history, and give an occasion for reflection on the passing of two eras.

As fighting dies down in Basra, the underlying tensions fueling the violence show no signs of abating.

For over a year now, political discussions of Iraq have focused on the question of whether or not the surge strategy is "working." This appeals to the can-do spirit of Americans, but as the winding-down battle in Basra indicates it does little justice to the complexity of the situation in Iraq. MORE

Acting on a US warrant, Bangkok police arrested Viktor Bout, the world's most notorious arms dealer.

The big lie about Viktor Bout is that he escaped capture because he was hard to find. In recent years he did hide -- the New York Times reports that during his two months in Bangkok he switched hotels often to avoid detection, landing finally at the swish Sofitel Silom -- but during his previous two decades of international mischief he conducted himself with surprising openness. He didn't get caught, because either through negligence or complicity, figures at the governmental level let him go, and let his business flourish. MORE